Treatment that does not bene®t the patient is generally viewed as futile, but signi®cant disagreement exists over the de®nition of``bene®t''. Some argue that`f utility'' applies only to those instances where the treatment will not accomplish the physiological eect which is being sought. Others claim that interventions which will extend life but without consciousness are also medically futile (Cranford and Gostin, 1992; Miles, 1992; Schneiderman, Faber-Langendoen, and Jecker, 1994; Solomon, 1993; Truog, Brett, and Frader, 1992) . Part of the de®nitional battle is the issue of the appropriate scope of physician discretion regarding such decisions.
Case Law
Decisions from the courts are similarly in con¯ict regarding the proper limits of physician control. The leading judicial cases on medical futility have held that treatment must be maintained as directed by the patient or surrogate even in the face of the doctor's or hospital's objection. These decisions rested on varying legal grounds and no uniform rationale has appeared. For example, the Court of Appeals decision in In re Baby K (1994) is based on the federal Emergency Medical Treatment and Labor Act, while the District Court in the same case relied on several statutes including the federal Americans with Disabilities Act (as cited in In re Baby K, 1994). The Georgia Supreme Court in In re Jane Doe (1992) interpreted a state consent statute to require the consent of both parents if treatment was to be withheld; and the probate court in In re Wanglie (1991) relied on guardianship principles to ®nd that the patient's husband was in the best position to act on behalf of his wife.
This invariable denial of physician discretion, however, has not extended to malpractice actions where there has been a tradition of deference, as a matter of law, to the standards of professional practice. Both judges and juries generally have been disinclined to punish physicians for their decisions in situations which were not presented to the courts for resolution prior to discontinuation of treatment. Thus, a trial court jury in Gilgunn v. Massachusetts (Mass. Sup. Ct. 1995) (as cited in New York Times``Withholding case '', 1995) refused to hold the hospital or physician liable when they issued a do-not resuscitate (DNR) order in the face of an objection voiced by the patient's daughter. Similarly, in Morgan v. Olds (1987) an Iowa appellate court refused to award damages on a number of legal bases in a malpractice action where the doctor wrote a DNR order over the spouse's objection. In Hartsell v. Fort Sanders Regional Medical Center (1995) and in LaSalle National Trust v. Swedish Covenant Hospital (1995) the courts denied plaintis' claims where a physician removed life support from an infant assessed as too premature to survive. These malpractice cases, in contrast to the``medical futility cases'', indicate that a physician may be permitted to withhold treatment despite the patient's or surrogate's wishes to the contrary, and still avoid civil liability in certain circumstances.
A more complete review of the state of the law which addresses the wide range of situations in which claims of medical futility are made, including state 1 and federal statutes, 2 and common law duties of informed consent, 3 produces an even more complex impression. Goldner, Johnson, and Wiener (1997) present a more detailed analysis of the law and of hospital policies with regard to these issues. Nonetheless, the two lines of cases presented here seem to demonstrate widely diering views as to the legal status of medical futility. The lack of a strong professional or social consensus on the issue may underlie the ambiguity in legal standards. The purpose of this research was to identify the beliefs and attitudes that professionals say they use when they make futility decisions. Our goal was to describe any emerging consensus or the dierences among professional or institutional perspectives that stand in the way of reaching such a consensus. We believe that any meaningful resolution to the policy confusion concerning futility judgments ought to begin by examining the decision principles that health care providers and administrators endorse. Our survey presented a list of potential criteria along with rating scales that asked the respondents (i.e., physicians, nurses, and administrators) to indicate the importance of each of the factors in recent decisions that were made at their hospitals. While our conclusions are essentially based on statistical comparisons, we collected the``to be rated'' factors after carefully reviewing ethical commentaries, case law, and published empirical investigations of end of life decision making. In the ®nal analysis our investigation employed a model building as opposed to a model testing methodology.
METHOD Respondents
The authors sent the Life Sustaining Treatment Survey to 1990 hospitals across the United States. 4 Each address carried an American Hospital Association (AHA) code which provided basic identifying information for the hospital. Two waves of surveys were mailed. The second wave was mailed to all hospitals which did not respond to the ®rst mailing.
One thousand seven hundred and thirty-four (87%) of the surveyed institutions were general medical facilities and 266 (13%) were specialty institutions. The majority were acute care hospitals (n 1795, 90%).
Twenty-eight percent of the original surveyed population, 15% in the ®rst wave and 13% in the second wave, returned completed surveys (N 536). To measure the eects of non-responding on the representativeness of our data, we conducted a contingency table analysis (see Table 1 ) in which type of hospital was one factor and response status was a second factor. The data for non-respondents were gathered from the AHA codes and the corresponding schedule of AHA demographic information. We compared the breakdown of hospital type among non-respondents, wave one respondents and wave two respondents. Wave one respondents were those who responded to the ®rst mailing and wave two respondents were those who would not have responded had they only received one mailing. Comparing the nonresponders to those who required a follow-up contact and to those who responded without reminder gives an estimate of the eect of non-responding on how well the achieved sample represents the sampled population. Table 1 shows that the largest dierence between non-responders and wave 1 responders in any of the controlling organizations was only 4% (religious not-for-pro®t hospitals). Further, across all hospital categories the dierences in the number of wave 1 and wave 2 respondents are trivial (i.e., never more than 2% for any category). Thus a careful review of Table 1 shows that overall the data adequately represent the types of organization that were selected from the American Hospital Association list.
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The mailings directed the recipients, Chief Executive Ocers, to forward the questionnaires to the chair of the hospital ethics committees or to the individual otherwise responsible for ful®lling ethics committee functions. Of the respondents who returned the Life Sustaining Treatment Surveys, 94% reported that their facilities had ethics committees. Eighty-one percent (443 of respondents) were members of ethics committees. Respondents included hospital administrators (n 210, 39%), nurses (n 166, 30%), physicians (n 147, 27%), risk management sta (n 81, 15%), pastoral care sta (n 58, 11%), Ph.D.'s (n 42, 8%), and combinations of all the above. Overall, the sample of 546 is representative of the surveyed population. (73) 297 (15) 249 (13) Note. Percentages are based on column totals.
5 A chi square analysis showed that the type of hospital was not independent of responding status, w 2 (8, N 1986 19.72, p 5 :02. In large part this is due to the high power that resulted from the very large sample size. Therefore, even very small dierences between percentages may reach conventional levels of signi®cance. 6 The percentages do not add to 100 because the survey allowed the respondents to indicate more than one professional identi®cation.
When asked whether the institution had an explicit written policy on decisions about medical futility, 137 (26%) replied that they did and 400 (74%) replied that they did not. Of the 137 who replied that they had futility policies, 115 (84%) forwarded copies of one or more policies to the research team. We reviewed all of the policies received, and the results of that review are reported in and Johnson, Gibbons, Goldner, Wiener, and Eton (1997) .
Materials
A number of other studies of decision-makers have examined doctors' and others' attitudes toward life-sustaining treatments, (Christakis and Asch, 1993, 1995; Fox and Stucking, 1993; Nightingale and Grant, 1988; Solomon, O'Donnell, and Jennings, 1993) and medical futility decisions (Swanson and McCrary, 1994) . The attitudes of individual providers are quite relevant even though other factors may in¯uence behavior in particular situations (SUPPORT, 1995) . This study diers from earlier studies in that it examines the attitudes toward medical futility decisions reported by hospital decision-makers and analyzes them as a function of the type of hospital in which the respondent works and the respondent's professional status. It also attempts to identify any consensus that exists among diverse decision-makers.
The Life Sustaining Treatment Survey used two sections to measure any existing consensus and dierences. Section I inquired about the type and number of policies at each responding institution and about the professional status of the person completing the survey. Section II listed 23 factors and asked respondents tò`r e¯ect back on previously decided cases that involved decisions of medical futility and rate the importance of each of the factors . . . in making those decisions''. An interdisciplinary project committee developed the 23 factors after reviewing the literature and case law on medical futility. Two committee members were experienced members of hospital ethics committees. We included factors that represented the issues identi®ed as important in the ethical and legal commentaries, in the case law, and among members of hospital ethics committees. Table 2 lists the factors. Respondents rated the importance of each factor on a 1±7 (1, very unimportant, 7, very important) scale.
RESULTS

Data reduction
We performed an exploratory principle components factor analysis with varimax rotation on the importance ratings of the 421 respondents who completed the 23 survey items. Results of the analysis produced a solution with seven factors with eigenvalues exceeding 1.00. The seven factors accounted for 59% of the measurement variance. (Table 2 displays the rotated factor structure, and the loadings for each of the items.) Items are assigned to one and only one factor, provided that the item's loading on only that factor exceeded a value of .45. We named each factor according to the pattern of the items that loaded most heavily on that factor. The resulting seven factors and the percent of measurement variance each explained were the following. Factor 1, interests of the patient (22%); Factor 2, patient's decision preferences (10%); Factor 3, customary care (i.e., treatment that would commonly be oered for patients suering from life ending illnesses) (7%); Factor 4, ability to provide resources for the patient (6%); Factor 5, needs of the patient or family (5%); Factor 6, probability of extending life (5%); and Factor 7, consistency of the judgment (4%).
7 These seven factors represent the decision criteria that the respondents reported relying upon when making decisions about medical futility. They are termed``decision factors'' in the remaining analyses. The decision factors constitute an initial judgment matrix that captures the futility decision policies suggested by a national sample of 421 health care professionals. While we recognize that additional research that makes use of dierent methodologies (i.e., manipulated scenario studies, in-depth interviews, and expanded ®eld surveys) with independent samples of health care professionals are needed to test these initial ®ndings, these seven decision factors represent the ®rst attempt to model the decision principles of medical futility judgments. In the analyses that follow, we tested the utility of these decision factors in discriminating between dierent types of hospital and dierently trained professionals. We reasoned that dierent types of hospital are likely to endorse dierent treatment philosophies and that dierent health care professionals are trained to emphasize alternative treatment values. Therefore, the minimal criterion of usefulness for our decision factors is the ability of these factors to dierentiate among types of hospital and types of professional.
Hospital Status and Decision Factors
We performed separate between-groups analyses of variance with controlling organization as the between-groups variable and factor scores for the seven decision factors as dependent measures. Dierences were found among hospital types for interest of the patient, F4; 414 2.89, p .022; ability to provide resources for the patient, F4; 414 5.89, p 5 .001; and consistency of the judgment, F4; 414 5.89, p 5 .006. (Table 3 displays the mean factor scores for the signi®-cant eects along with the results of post hoc comparisons between means broken down by hospital type.)
The results indicate that respondents from state or local government-supported hospitals rated the patients' interests as less important than did respondents from either religious or non-religious not-for-pro®t hospitals when making decisions about medical futility. Further, respondents from government hospitals (state, federal, or local) were less concerned with the ability of the family to provide resources for the patients than were the private for-pro®t and not-for-pro®t hospitals. However, respondents from the for-pro®t hospitals rated the ability to provide resources as more important than did respondents from any of the other types of hospital. Notably, the religious, not-for-pro®t hospitals rated the consistency of the judgment (i.e., need for a second opinion and the institution's mission) as Note. The entries in the columns are mean factor scores, therefore the higher the number the more important is the decision factor for the respondents' futility judgments. Means in any column with dierent subscripts are signi®cantly dierent at the .05 level using the Newman±Keuls post hoc comparisons procedure.
more important than did the non-religious, not-for-pro®t hospitals or the federal government hospitals. The generalizability of this ®nding should be treated cautiously and requires further study, however, due to the slight overrepresentation of not-for-pro®t institutions among respondents.
Respondent Status and Decision Factors
To determine whether dierent types of respondent rely more heavily on dierent types of factor when making medical futility judgments, we performed a 2 Â 2 between-group multivariate analysis of variance using whether or not the respondent was a member of the institutional ethics committee as one factor, and whether or not the respondent was a hospital administrator as a second factor. Factor scores for the seven decision factors served as dependent measures. A multivariate model was used because the focus was on dierences between types of respondent across all decision factors. We repeated this analysis ®ve more times replacing the second factor with whether or not the respondent was a a) medical doctor, b) doctor of philosophy, (c) nurse, (d) pastoral care sta, or (e) risk management sta. A signi®cant multivariate eect, Mult. F7; 411 5.14, p 5 .001, was found for nurse status. Univariate analyses showed that compared to other respondents, nurses rated as more important customary care (M .20 and À.09), F1; 417 6.25, p . 013 and needs of the patient or family (M .37 and À.17), F1; 417 18.74, p 5 .001. These means are mean factor scores, therefore the higher the number the more important is the decision factor for the respondents' futility judgments. Nurses rated as less important the consistency of the medical judgment (M À.14 and .06 F1; 417 6.25, p .011.
Another multivariate eect was found for medical doctors, Mult. F7; 411 3.95, p 5 .001, and one for risk management sta, 8 Mult. F7; 411 2.50, p .016. With regard to medical doctors, follow-up univariate tests showed that, compared to other respondents, physicians rated as less important customary care (M À.34 and .12), F1; 417 13.62, p 5 .001, and the ability to provide resources for the patient (M À.23 and .08) F1; 417 8.21, p .004.
In summary, the data suggest dierences among respondents relating to their profession. Nurses considered customary care and needs of the patient or family as more important and consistency of the medical judgment as less important than other factors. Physicians rated customary care and the availability of resources as signi®cantly less important than other factors.
Pro®le Analysis
To determine whether respondents agreed upon speci®c strategies, we performed a pro®le analysis on the decision-making factors. First, we performed cluster analysis using the decision factors as variables to separate the respondents into groups of similar decision-makers. Cluster analysis separates observations (in this case respondents) into groups that are maximally distant from each other on the criterion variables. Our cluster analysis separated the respondents into groups that were maximally dierent with regard to the importance ratings that they assigned to the decision factors. We used the scores on the seven factors recorded for each respondent hospital as criteria for the cluster analysis. Next, we performed multivariate analysis of variance using the cluster membership of respondents as a between subject factor and the decision factors as dependent variables.
The goal of this analysis was to identify groups of respondents who agree that certain factors are important in making futility decisions and who disagree with members of other groups about the importance of those and other decision factors. If the groups are signi®cantly dierent on the decision factor ratings, then they represent distinctive decision policies about which identi®able groups of professionals agree.
Using the SPSS cluster algorithm (kmeans method) with analysis of variance tables, we found that with a ®ve cluster solution in which we eliminated two clusters because of small sample size (n 4 16, n 5 5) we were able to construct three remaining groups (n 1 122, n 2 142, and n 6 136) for which we calculated a signi®cant multivariate eect with all decision factors as dependent variables, F14; 782 69.34, p 5 .001, and signi®cant univariate F values for all decision factors separately (all p values less than .015).
9 Thus, the solution to the cluster analysis was derived purely on an empirical basis. (Table 4 displays the three groups of respondents and the mean decision factor scores for each group. Included in Table 4 are post hoc analyses that indicate which mean scores are signi®cantly dierent with the Newman±Keuls test.) The three groups of respondents form three distinct decision strategy types.
Group I is most concerned with both the patient's own decision preferences and the ability of the family to provide resources for the patient. The strategy adopted by the Group I decision-makers might be based on a policy of protecting the patient's autonomy and freedom within the resources available to support the patient, but Note. The entries in the columns are mean factor scores, therefore the higher the number the more important is the decision factor for the respondents' futility judgments. Means in any row with dierent subscripts are signi®cantly dierent at the .05 level of analysis using the Newman±Keuls post hoc comparisons for all means. The sample sizes for the three groups are 122, 142, and 136, respectively. See the accompanying text for a full description of each of the strategy types represented by the three groups.
rejects the importance of psychosocial need factors (hereafter, patient autonomy group). Group II respondents rated as most important the ability to provide resources for the patient and the needs of the patient and family. Respondents in Group II rated least important the probability of extending the patient's life and the consistency of the judgment. The policy represented by the ratings of the Group II decision-makers might be to protect the patient, his or her family, and the institution from ®nancial and social hardships which could result from any prolonged and hopeless illness (hereafter, patient protection group). Finally, Group III respondents rated the interests of the patient, customary care, the probability of extending life, and the consistency of the judgment as the most important factors. The least important factors were the ability to provide resources and the patient's decision preferences. 10 The policy represented by Group III's strategy is to make the decision based upon medical and social norms that are de®ned from an objective, as opposed to subjective, point of view independent of the patient's perspective or resource obstacles (hereafter, normative decision group).
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DISCUSSION AND LIMITATIONS
Emerging from our analyses was a judgment matrix comprised of seven decision factors that captured the judgment policies of the professional health care sta who completed our surveys. We found that these factors discriminated among hospital types as well as professional health care workers. As to hospital type, these preliminary results suggest that there may be important dierences among respondents from for-pro®t, not-for-pro®t and government hospitals. For example, respondents from for-pro®t hospitals rated the ability to provide resources as more important than did respondents from any other facilities. Additional comparisons showed signi®cant eects for professional status on the decision factors. For physicians, our data failed to indicate positive predictors for futility decisions, suggesting a lack of consensus among physician respondents. In contrast, the data suggested that nurses did identify some common factors (i.e., customary care and the needs of the patient and family) in medical futility decisions. The data also suggested that there is no emerging consensus on decision-making strategy among respondents, but rather support of least three dierent approaches (i.e., emphasis on the patient's own decision preferences, emphasis on providing for the patient and her or his family, and emphasis on objective medical and social norms). It is unlikely that the law will realize its full potential to regulate futility judgments until explicitly articulated professional standards emerge. Eective regulations presuppose principled decision criteria that professionals bring to the end of life decisions. There is a need for continued empirical research to document and test judgment principles as more re®ned policy positions emerge. 10 The factors,``interests of the patients'' and``patients' decision preferences'' can be distinguished as they are used in this context in that the former refers to the patient's needs which the patient may or may not recognize and the latter refers to the choices made solely by the patient. 11 The results suggest that these norms are objective and independent of the patient's perspective because this group of respondents rated as less important both the patient's ability to provide needed resources and the patient's own decision preferences. The ability to provide for oneself and the ability to make decisions for oneself comprise central features of one's subjective point of view.
We had a moderate response rate. However, comparing demographic data from non-respondents, wave 1 respondents, and wave 2 respondents suggests that the eect of non-responding on the representatives of our sample was not substantial. Further, we have no reason to believe that the nonrespondents would have had more de®ned opinions on these issues. Indeed, it seems far more likely that nonrespondents, if anything, would have had fewer well articulated approaches.
It should be also be noted that the researchers provided the list of factors on the survey instrument and this list may have limited respondents' choices and therefore may have exerted some in¯uence on the decision strategies identi®ed. However the 23 items listed were developed by an interdisciplinary team after an exhaustive review of the existing literature. Further, the patterns we described emerged even though the items were presented in a random order on the questionnaire. Finally, the response data revealed no single favored strategy or consensus for medical futility decision-making.
Analyses of the responses did reveal provocative observations regarding the lack of any consensus about the meaning of futility within the hospital setting itself. Our pro®le analysis suggested that there are at least three independent futility decision policies that professionals endorse. Although the current literature on medical futility tends to focus on physician authority in decision-making, the results indicating a lack of consensus among physician respondents should stimulate more empirical research and caution in allocating futility decisions to the individual physician alone. Nurse respondents diered signi®cantly in their assessment of the importance of certain factors as compared to doctors. Again, this must be tested in further study, but this result has implications for end-of-life care in which nurses play a predominant role, and for the role of multidisciplinary ethics committees in futility decision-making. Results indicating dierences among institutions also bear further investigation within the debate concerning the reorganization of health care.
At a minimum, these results indicate a strong likelihood of inconsistency in judgments concerning medical futility in particular cases. Ultimately studies such as the present one will help identify the factors that will form the basis for a consensus concerning these important end of life treatment decisions. This study suggests the manner in which sociolegal research can have an important impact in shaping medical futility policies and law.
